Introduction
The liberalization of telecommunications markets has been marked by a number of mergers and alliances, some of which have been record setting. Examples Recent economic research has focused on incentives of larger network operators to discriminate against smaller rivals with respect to the quality of connectivity between 1 The FCC did allow AOL Time Warner the opportunity to obtain relief from the Instant-Messaging requirement by showing clear and convincing evidence that the requirement no longer served the public interest.
networks. Crémer et al. (2000) find that larger Internet backbone networks have an incentive to lower the quality of their interconnection with smaller rivals. Foros and Hansen (2001) find conditions under which two rival Internet Service Providers over invest in compatibility to avoid competitive pressure when they compete a-la Hotelling. Cambini and Valletti (2003) find that operators have an incentive to under invest in quality when network quality has an impact on the number of calls. Ennis (2003) finds that when customers receive decreasing marginal utility from additional users on the network, then smaller networks derive more value from interconnection than do larger networks.
This paper extends this research by examining how market concentration and technology choices affect network quality. I examine a duopoly in which customers initially form expectations regarding network quality and size, then firms simultaneously choose either a flexible technology that makes it uneconomical to make quality commitments prior to choosing outputs, or a rigid technology that has the opposite effect.
Previous models of network quality have assumed that firms make credible commitments for quality before choosing output. This sequence is probably appropriate for networks of fax machines and computer components, where hardware design determines compatibility with rivals' products. However, software determines interconnection quality in Instant Messaging and in some aspects of the Internet. Firms' network maintenance choices and circuit choices 2 also determine interconnection quality in the Internet. Firms can change these quality choices while providing output. As a result of 2 Physical telecommunications networks interconnect through physical circuits. Variations in the quality of manufacturer equipment can cause circuits to vary in the quality of their transmission of telecommunications signals. A firm can discriminate against rivals by choosing to interconnect using circuits that provide below-average transmission quality.
this possibility, I assume that firms can choose technologies that determine whether the firm's make credible quality commitments before choosing outputs.
If firms choose the flexible technology, then they simultaneously choose output, network quality for internal communications (which I call internal quality), and interconnection quality for communications between networks (which I call external quality). Otherwise, firms choose qualities and then output. Lastly, customers choose their network providers.
3
To examine how market concentration affects firms' incentives to provide quality, I consider two sources of asymmetry in network size. Following Crémer et al. (2000), I
consider models where networks have exogenously determined existing customer bases of different sizes at the start of the game and that these existing customers' purchasing decisions do not change during the game. I also consider models where the firms have different marginal production costs. I find that differences in existing customer bases cause the large firm to prefer a lower external quality than the small firm when the two firms interconnect their networks. Networks optimally choose identical external qualities when differences in network size result from differences in marginal production costs. I also find that the small network prefers an internal quality that is lower than both the large network's preferred internal quality. Except when the small network makes a credible quality commitment before choosing output, the small network prefers an internal quality that is lower than its preferred external quality.
3 I limit my analysis to situations where equilibria exist by considering only customer expectations of output and quality that are equal to actual output and quality in equilibrium. (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) I also limit my analysis to stable equilibria by considering equilibria where the demand curve intersects firms' marginal costs curves from above. (Rohlfs, 1974) The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 presents situations where the firms can make credible quality commitments before choosing outputs. Section 4 presents the case in which quality and output are determined simultaneously. Section 5 is the conclusion. Proofs and details on simulations are in the Appendix.
The Model

Demand and Supply
I consider an extension of the model developed by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Crémer et al. (2000) A revealed preferences analysis is sufficient to confirm Lemma 1. Firm i is always able to make the same choices in a game where quality and output are chosen simultaneously as in a game where quality and output are chosen sequentially.
Therefore, i's profits are at least has great in a simultaneous move game as in a sequential move game. Consequently, firm i will choose the rigid technology only if it is less costly than the flexible technology by an amount that is greater in absolute value than the difference between firm i's profits in a simultaneous move game and those in a sequential move game.
There are up to three markets for the network service and two firms, L and S. represent firm i's quality choice for external connectivity between its network and j's network, for j ≠ i. Quality includes such things as capacity for customers of physical networks to exchange messages, and features, such as with instant messaging. A choice of zero represents a refusal to interconnect. Network quality is perfectly observable to firms and customers alike. In some industries, regulators require firms to interconnect their networks. Regulated telecommunications is an example of a network industry where regulators require interconnection. The Internet is generally unregulated. Refusal to interconnect is rare in the Internet, but controversy over type of interconnection is common. See Kende (2000) for an excellent overview. 5 Technically, the term i q µ in (1) should be 1 − i q µ because customers do not obtain value from accessing themselves. I suppress the -1 and assume that q is sufficiently large that it does not affect the results. If the -1 were included, its effect would be to lower each firm's internal quality relative to external quality.
For simplicity, I assume that each firm chooses a single internal quality and that two firms have a single external quality for interconnecting with each other. I consider situations where only one quality choice can prevail for each network interconnection.
For example, if one firm chose a capacity of 45 megabits per second and the other chose a capacity of 30 megabits per second, only 30 megabits per second of information could be passed between the networks. Following Crémer et al. (2000) and Ennis (2003) , I
assume that if firms prefer different external qualities that they engage in Nash bargaining to agree upon a single quality. (Nash, 1950; Lopomo and Ok, 2001) Lemma 2. Given the assumptions of the model, each customer of type τ is indifferent between networks at equilibrium, i.e., 
Combining (1), (2), and (3) gives the customers' inverse demand curve for firm i in market m ( )
where j β is the number of customers that purchase from j in markets other than m.
I examine situations where L optimally chooses to provide a larger network than S optimally chooses. This might be the situation if the firms exogenously serve multiple markets and L has a larger customer base than does S in these markets, or if L has lower marginal production costs than S for every is increasing in quality and convex. For simplicity, I assume that quality costs are independent of the number of customers. The assumption simplifies notation and does not affect results.
Each firm takes its rivals' quality and output choices as given when it chooses its own quality and output levels. Firm i's profit maximization problem can be written as:
The surplus a customer receives from purchasing depends on the innate value the customer places on the network service, on the internal and external quality choices of the customer's network supplier, and the total number of customers who purchase the network services. In each market, a customer only purchases if he values the service at least as much as the marginal customer does. Recalling that utility and i m p are zero for customers that do not purchase from firm i, integrating over all customers who purchase and summing over all firms and all markets gives the net consumer surplus:
and weighted social welfare:
( ) ( )
where α = [0, 1] is the weight given to net consumer surplus and i T is a transfer payment from consumers to firm i that may be necessary to ensure non-negative profits, for example. If a social planner chooses q and θ to maximize weighted social welfare subject to a non-negative profit constraint for firms, she would: (i) equate the sum of the marginal consumer surplus and the positive network externality to the marginal production cost; and (ii) equate the marginal consumer surplus from quality and the marginal cost of quality.
Sequential Quality and Output Choices
In this section I consider situations where Condition 1 holds for both firms so that they make credible quality commitments before choosing output. a. The large firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is greater than either firm's preferred external quality and that is greater than the small firm's optimal internal quality; and b. The small firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is lower than either firm's preferred external quality.
That is to say,
My model does not solve analytically, so I demonstrate Proposition 1 using a simulation. Figure 1 increases, firm L increases its internal quality and decreases its external quality preferences. Firm S decreases its internal quality and increases its external quality preferences. Firm L's internal quality choice is always greater than its preferred external quality because higher external quality would lead its rival to increase its output, which would result in a lower market clearing price. Similarly, firm L's internal quality choice is always greater than firm S's preferred external quality. Firm L's optimal internal quality is greater than firm S's optimal internal quality because the marginal benefit to a customer of increasing quality is increasing in the number of customers with whom this customer can communicate at the higher quality, i.e., a customer values communicating with L's customers more than communicating with S's customers. 
Asymmetric Marginal Production Costs in the Sequential Move Setting
In this subsection I consider situations where Condition 1 holds and L has lower marginal production costs than S, i.e., a. The large firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is greater than either firm's preferred external quality and that is greater than the small firm's optimal internal quality; b. The firms optimally choose identical external qualities that are lower than the small firm's optimal internal quality.
That is to say, increases, firm L increases its internal quality and S decreases its internal quality preferences in accordance with the greater (conversely, lower) value that customers place on connectivity with their respective networks.
In choosing external quality, each firm considers its expected network size, the expected size of the rival network, and v, the value a customer places on communicating with another customer. Each firm considers its own network size because this determines the number of customers that are willing to pay prices that reflect the value of the external quality. Each firm considers the other firm's network size because more customers on other networks increase the value of the interconnection. This symmetry in factors that determine quality leads the firms to choose symmetric external qualities. The large firm does not strategically degrade the quality of its interconnection with its rival.
Proposition 2 contributes to the literature on network connectivity by showing that the source of customers affects whether firms disagree on external quality. If some customers are exogenous, then firms have different external quality preferences because the large firm is unwilling to invest in quality for its exogenous customers to be able to communicate with the small firm's customers. However, the small firm is willing to invest in quality for its endogenous customers to be able to communicate with the large firm's customers. Thus the asymmetry in the number of exogenous customers drives an asymmetry in preferences for external quality. a. The large firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is greater than either firm's preferred external quality and that is greater than the small firm's optimal internal quality; and b. The small firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is lower than either firm's preferred external quality.
My model does not solve analytically, so I demonstrate Proposition 3 using a simulation. Figure 2 
, which makes quality more profitable. It follows from the previous statement that S prefers a higher external quality than internal quality. a. The large firm optimally chooses an internal quality that is greater than either firm's preferred external quality and that is greater than the small firm's optimal internal quality; b. The small firm's optimal internal quality is lower than its preferred external quality; and c. The two firms choose identical external qualities.
As I described for Proposition 2, in choosing external quality, each firm considers its network size, the size of the rival network, and v, the value a customer places on communicating with another customer, i.e., ( )
is the same for both firms, they choose symmetric external qualities. Furthermore, each firm determines internal quality based on v and its output choice squared, i.e.,
The output choice is squared because more customers on the firm's own network increase the value of the network, and each customer represents someone who will pay a price that reflects that value.
The large firm provides the highest quality because its optimal output is higher than its rival's optimal output. This higher output makes the large firm's network more valuable to customers than its rival's network. Furthermore, for connection to a network of a given size, the large firm's higher output makes quality more profitable for it than for its rival. The rival optimally chooses an internal quality that is lower than the quality of its interconnections with the large firm because connection with the large firm's network provides more value to the small firm's customers than does its own network.
Conclusion
In this paper, I examine incentives for quality in network connectivity. I find that when firms have exogenous customers, the large network prefers a lower external quality than does the small network. Otherwise, large and small networks agree on external quality. I also find in all situations that I model that the large network optimally chooses an internal quality that is higher than either firm's preferred external quality. The small network's optimal internal quality is lower than either firm's preferred external quality except when the firms choose the rigid technology and the firms have asymmetric marginal production costs.
My results extend the results of earlier research by identifying conditions under which a large network and small network would agree on external quality. This raises questions about past US and EU regulators' restrictions on mergers. According to my analysis, a large firm would provide its own customers with higher quality connectivity than it would provide its smaller rival, but the large firm's interconnection quality choice would be no different in a game with only endogenous output than the small network's interconnection quality choice for connecting with the large firm. Furthermore, the interconnection quality the large firm would choose for connecting with the small firm would be higher than the quality the smaller firm would choose for its internal connectivity.
In this analysis I do not model situations in which one firm chooses flexible technology and the other chooses rigid technology. Nor do I explicitly model mergers.
These extensions will be addressed in future research.
From ( 
Specifications for Simulations
Using (5), I approximate quality preferences using the FindRoot function in Mathematica. This function relies on versions of Newton's method for finding numerical solutions to systems of simultaneous equations that cannot be solved analytically. In sequential games, I use backwards induction to express optimal outputs in terms of parameters and quality choices. I then use FindRoot to find numerical solutions for quality preferences. In simultaneous move games, I solve for outputs and qualities 22 together using FindRoot. Table A1 shows 
